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Ogbu: Combating Corruption in Nigeria

COMBATING CORRUPTION IN
NIGERIA: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
THE LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE
POLITICAL WILL

OSITA NNAMANI OGBU·

I.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is pervasive and widespread in Nigerian society. It has
permeated all facets of life, and every segment of society is involved. In
recent times, Nigeria has held the unenviable record of being considered
one of the most corrupt countries among those surveyed I. The Political
Bureau, set up under the Ibrahim Babangida regime, summed up the
magnitude of corruption in Nigeria as follows:
It [corruption] pervades all strata of the society. From
the highest level of the political and business elites to the
ordinary person in the village.
Its multifarious
manifestations include the inflation of government
contracts in return for kickbacks; fraud and falsification
of accounts in the public service; examination

* Senior Lecturer, and Ag. Head, Department of Commercial and Property Law, Anambra
State University, Igbariam, Nigeria
1. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
Perceptions Index (1996 - 2(05),
http://www.transparency.orglpolicy_research/surveys_indiceslcpi. Nigeria, however, recorded some
improvement in the 2006 Corruption Perception Index.
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2006, 7 (2006), available at
http://www.transparency .orglcontentldownloadll 0825192857/versionli/fi lelCPC2006_presski t_eng.
pdf.
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malpractices in our educational institutions including
universities; the taking of bribes and perversion of
justice among the police, the Judiciary and other organs
for administering justice; and various heinous crimes
against the state in business and industrial sectors of our
economy, in collusion with multinational companies
such as over-invoicing of goods, foreign exchange
swindling, hoarding and smuggling. At the village level,
corruption manifests itself in such forms as adulteration
of market goods or denting of measures to reduce their
contents with a view to giving advantage to the seller. 2
Other manifestations of corruption in Nigeria today include the buying of
votes, election rigging and malpractices, the use of money to sway the
national and state assemblies, and political donations by private
corporations.
President Olusegun Obasanjo, upon coming to power for a second time
on May 31, 1999, promised that fighting corruption would be one of the
policy thrusts of his administration. Accordingly, the first bill he
forwarded to the National Assembly was the Corrupt Practices and Other
Related Offenses bill, which became the Corrupt Practices and Other
Related Offenses Act of 2000 (hereinafter the "Act").3 The provisions of
the Act set up the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related
Offenses Commission (hereinafter the "ICPC").4 Subsequently, the
Legislature enacted the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act
of 2004 which, in tum, established the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission. s President Obasanjo established, among other initiatives
throughout the Presidency, a policy and programmes monitoring unit6
and a Due Process Office. 7 This paper seeks to critically examine the
legal and institutional framework for combating corruption that existed
before Nigeria's nascent democracy, and the anti-corruption mechanisms
and measures put in place by the Obasanjo regime. The effectiveness of
2.
(1987).

DIRECfORATE FOR SOCIAL MOBIUSATION, REPORT OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU at 212-219

3. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No. 5 (Nigeria). Nigerian
statutes, including the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, are available at,
http://www.nigeria-Iaw.org.
4. Id. § 3(1).
5.
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, (2004) § I (Nigeria)
available at, www.efcc.nig.org.
6. See "Nigeria: From Pond of Corruption to Island of Integrity" being the text of a lecture
delivered by President Obasanjo at the 10th Anniversary Celebration of Transparency International,
Berlin, Nov 7, 2003; the Guardian, Thur Nov 13,2003 p. 8.
7. See The ABC of the Contract Due Process Policy available at, www.brnpiu.gov.ng.
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the laws and the institutions and their limitations will be considered.
Lastly, the political will to fight corruption will also be examined.

II. THE MEANING OF CORRUPTION
Corruption is a word with so many facets and ramifications that it cannot
be easily defined. The World Bank has defined corruption as "the abuse
of public office for private gain."8 According to the World Bank, a
public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits,
or extorts a bribe.9 Further, abuse of a public office occurs when private
agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes
for competitive advantage and profit.lO Even if no bribery occurs, public
office can be abused for personal benefit as well, through patronage and
nepotism, the theft of state assets, and the diversion of state revenue. 11
These definitions are deficient, however, in that they are
concerned
only with public sector corruption, thereby ignoring corruption in the
private sector.
Additionally, Transparency International (hereinafter "TI") has defined
corruption as "the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit."12 This
definition appears to be as deficient as the World Bank's definition.
"Entrusted power" suggests power within a public office, however, in
some cases it may also arise in private matters. Furthermore, corruption
may involve an exercise of power neither expressly nor implicitly
granted.
In the Nigerian case of Biobaku v. Police,13 Bairarnian, J. defined

corruption as the receiving or offering of some benefit as a reward or
inducement to sway or deflect the receiver from the honest and impartial
discharge of his duties. However, this definition appears to define
bribery more so than corruption because corruption is a wider concept
that encompasses bribery. In effect, corruption may occur without the
element of receiving or offering some benefit as a reward or inducement
8.
THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK 8-9 (1997), available at,
http://wwwl. worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorruptlcorruptn/corrptn.pdf. See also PROBLEMS OF
CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 4 - 5 (Ignatius Anyua et al. eds., Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced
Legal Studies, 2002) (quoting the World Bank definition).
9.
THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK 8-9 (1997).
10.
[d.
II. [d.
12.
JEREMY POPE, TI SOURCE BOOK 2000: CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A
NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM 13 (2000), available at ,
http://www.transparency.org/contentldownloadl2439/14493/file/sourcebook.pdf.zip.
13.
Biobaku v. Police [1951]20 N.L.R. 30 (Nigeria).
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to sway or deflect the receiver from the honest and impartial discharge of
his duties.
Assisi Asobie, a renowned professor of political science at the University
of Nigeria, defined corruption as "unethical behaviour or practice."14
According to Professor Asobie, corrupt activity is that which violates the
ethics of society in general, or the ethics of one's office, position,
profession, or calling, where ethics means a system of morals, the rules
governing behavior, or standards of conduct. 15 This definition is so wide
that it defeats its own meaning l6 and may result in confusion of thought
and analysis. In legal parlance, corruption normally means conduct
prohibited by law. Going by Asobie's definition, there may be some
unethical conducts which, though not illegal, nevertheless qualify as
corruption. There may also be unethical conduct that does not amount to
corruption. For example, it is unethical for a person to slap his father,
yet this does not amount to corruption, strictly speaking.
Lateef Adegbite also adopts the moralist approach in defining corruption.
He defined corruption as "moral deterioration, depravity and perversion
of integrity by bribery or favour."I? He said that corruption in its widest
sense "connotes the perversion of anything from its original state of
purity, a kind of infection or infected condition."18 According to
Adegbite, corruption in its most basic sense means acting or inducing an
act with the intent of improperly securing an advantage. 19 This definition
suffers from the same defects as that of Professor Asobie. In legal
parlance, an act or omission which constitutes corruption must be
prohibited by law at the pain of punishment. Furthermore, a person
involved in corruption may seek to secure an improper advantage for
another person rather than himself.
Unfortunately, the Nigerian Criminal Code, the Penal Code, and the
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act of 2000 do not provide
a sufficient definition of corruption. For instance, Section 2 of the Act
provides that "corruption" includes "bribery, fraud, and other related

14.
Professor Assisi Asobie, Remarks at the Transparency International Workshop in Abuja,
Nigeria: Corruption in Campaign Financing and Party Funding p. 3 (August 2000).
15.
[d.
16.
It must be stated, however, that Professor Asobie recognized that his definition is a broad
one.; See [d. at 6.
17.
Lateef Adegbite, Towards the Evolution of a Corrupt Free Society: The Role and Duties of
the Citizenry, in PERSPECfNE ON CORRUPTION AND OTHER ECONOMIC CRIMES IN NIGERIA (Bola
Ajibola et al. eds., 1991).
18.
[d.
19.
[d.
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offenses. "20 In the light of the shortcomings of the definitions of
corruption highlighted above, I define corruption as an abuse of position
or inducement of an abuse of position for an undeserved benefit,
advantage or relief. Corruption, in the context of this work, includes all
forms of economic crimes.

III. THE PRE-EXISTING LEGAL MECHANISM FOR
COMBATING CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA PRIOR TO THE
CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES
ACT 2000
Both the Nigerian Criminal Code and the Penal Code, which are
comprehensive sets of criminal laws that apply in Southern and Northern
Nigeria, contain provisions aimed at tackling corruption in the public
sector. The two Codes prohibit both the demand for and the receipt of
bribes by public officers,21 as well as the giving and offering of bribes to
public officers. 22 However, the provisions of the Criminal Code on
corruption are so technical and complicated, that otherwise guilty
persons normally escape punishment. 23 The provisions on corruption in
the Penal Code are more lucid and less technical. Of course, at the time
these Codes were enacted, corruption had not become as large in scope
as it has today.
Both the Criminal and Penal Codes contain glaring inadequacies. First,
they do not address corruption in the private sector. Second, there is the
likelihood that charges will be brought under the wrong Section of the
law. This may lead to a strong possibility of unmerited acquittals
because the Criminal Code failed to simplify the offense of corruption. 24
Finally, both codes fail to widen the scope of the offense. 25

20.
Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 2 (Nigeria).
21.
Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. 77, §§ 98, 99, 101 - 103; Penal Code (Northern States)
Federal Provisions Act, (1990) Cap. 345, §§ 115-122 (Nigeria).
22.
Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. 77, §§ 98; Penal Code (Northern States) Federal
Provisions Act, (1990) Cap. 345, §§ 115-122 (Nigeria).
23.
The Court observed in Amechi v. Comm'r of Police [1958) N.R.N.L.R. 123, 126
(Nigeria) that the law relating to official corruption and kindred offenses is not easy and that the
advice of law officers should be sought whenever possible before proceedings are taken. For
instance, in Rex v. Anyaleme [1943)9 W.A.C.A. 23 (Nigeria), a police constable was induced by a
bribe of five pounds not to prosecute an offender for forgery. It was held that the accused was
wrongly convicted under Section 98 of the Criminal Code. The appropriate Section should have
been Section 116(2).
24.

[d.

25.
See the observations of Professor Taiwo Osipitan and Oyelowo Oyewo to this effect in
their paper "Structuring Measures Against Corruption for Sustainable Development" presented at the
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In their application, the two Codes were grossly inadequate in dealing
with cases of corruption as corruption increased throughout the country.26
Accordingly, many of the military regimes, which sought to justify their
intervention into governance on the need to cleanse the nation of corrupt
practices, enacted various military decrees on the subject of corruption
offenses. 27 The ad hoc measures adopted by the various military regimes
to combat corruption did not normally outlive the particular regime that
adopted the measure. For instance, the two regimes that demonstrated
their genuine intention to combat corruption - the Murtala Mohammed
and the BuhariJldiagbon regimes - were so short-lived that the measures
put in place by them did not take roOt. 28

IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM
The Constitution has a number of provisions which seek to eradicate or
reduce corruption. Such provisions include the provision under the
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy; the
provision for separation of powers and checks and balances; the
provision for audit of public accounts; and the provision for the code of
conduct. 29
A.

THE FuNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF
STATE POLICY

Section 15(5) of the 1999 Constitution under the fundamental objectives
and directive principles of state policy requires the state to abolish
corrupt practices and abuse of power. 30 Under Section 13 of the
Constitution, all organs of the government are required to conform to and
observe the provisions of the chapter on fundamental objectives and
directive principles of state policy.3l Item 60(a) of the exclusive

Nigerian Association of Law Teachers Conference held at Lagos State University, Ojo,
April 23 - 26. 2007 at II.
26. !dat 11-12.
(Nigeria);
27.
See Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree No. 51 (1966),
Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree No. 37 (1968); Investigation of
Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) (Amendment) Decree No. 43 (1968); Corrupt Practices
Decree No. 38 (1975); Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Decree No.3
(1984); Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) (Amendment) Decree No.8
(1984); Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) (Amendment No.2) Decree No. 14
(1984); Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Decree No.3 (1984). (All are
Nigerian legislation.)
28.
The regime was overthrown in a coup led by Generallbrahim Babangida on August 27,
1985
See CONSTITUTION, Art. 4 -12,13 - 24,85,172, Fifth Schedule (1999) (Nigeria).
29.
CONSTITUTION, Art. 15(5) (1999) (Nigeria).
30.
31. CONSTITUTION, Art. 13 (1999) (Nigeria).
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Legislative list empowers the National Assembly to make laws for the
establishment and regulation of authorities for the federation, or any part
thereof, and to promote and enforce the observance of the fundamental
objectives and directive principles contained in the Constitution. 32 In
A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation & 35 Ors,33 the Ondo State
Government challenged the competence of the National Assembly to
enact the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act No. 5 of
2000.
The Supreme Court held that the National Assembly is
empowered under item 60(a) of the exclusive legislative list, to create
necessary legislation to establish and regulate the ICPC for the federation
(a body established to eradicate corrupt practices in consonance with
Section 15(5) of the Constitution).34
B.

SEPARATION OF POWER AND CHECKS AND BALANCES

The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria is anchored on the principle of
separation of power. The doctrine of separation of power is subject to
the twin principle of checks and balances. One of the legislative checks
on the Executive is the power of investigation conferred on the
Legislature by the Constitution. Article 88 of the Constitution confers on
the Legislature the power to investigate, among other things, the conduct
of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged
with the responsibility of executing or administering laws enacted by the
National Assembly, or disbursing or administering moneys appropriated
or to be appropriated by the National Assembly.35 Under Article 88(2),
the purpose of the power conferred by Article 88( 1) is to enable the
Legislature to:
(a) make laws with respect to any matter within its
legislative competence and correct any defects in
existing laws; and
(b) expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste in the
execution or administration of laws within its legislative
competence and in the disbursement or administration of
funds appropriated by it. 36

32.
CONSTITUTION, Second Schedule (Exclusive Legislative List). Item 60(a) (1999) (Nigeria).
33.
A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation & 35 Ors, [2002) 9 N.W.L.R. (pt 772) 222 (Nigeria).
Similar decisions were also reached in Re: Chief Adebiyi OIafisonye [2004) A.F.W.L.R. (pt 198) I
(Nigeria); Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Anache [2004)14 W.R.N. 1 (Nigeria).
34.
A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation & 35 Ors, [2002)9 N.W.L.R. 222 (Nigeria).
CONSTITUTION, Art. 88 (1999) (Nigeria).
35.
36.
[d.
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The stark reality, however, is that the Nigerian Legislature is not
independent of the Executive.
First, the majority of the state houses of assembly exist only in name,
primarily to rubber-stamp Executive acts. In the case of the National
Assembly, a combination of factors has made it a lap-dog of the
Executive. Adolphus Wabara, the former President of the Senate, was
never elected. 37 From initial results released by the Independent National
Electoral Commission (hereinafter "INEC"), he lost the senatorial
election to Elder Dan Imo. 38 Events later took on a new twist when news
circulated that Adolphus Wabara was the candidate President Olusegun
Obasanjo wanted for the office of Senate President based on his past
loyalty to the President. 39 Suddenly, other results of the same election
began to emerge. 40 One of the subsequent results declared Wabara the
winner of the election. Wabara, who had gone to the election tribunal in
Umuahia to challenge his defeat, later withdrew the case from the
tribunal and left for Abuja, where he obtained an ex-parte order directing
INEC to release the certificate of return to the rightful winner of the
election. 41 INEC issued a certificate of return to Wabara on June 2,
2003.42 On June 3, 2003, he was elected Senate President.43 Naturally,
Wabara cowered before the President. 44
Second, as a result of the undemocratic internal structure of the ruling,
the People's Democratic Party (hereinafter "PDP") maintained a policy
that if any member of the National Assembly raises a serious voice
against the actions of the Executive, he has no chance of being
nominated by the party for a second term. 45 Before the last general
elections, the National Chairman of the PDP allegedly circulated a list of
National Assembly members who were qualified for nomination based
on their past loyalty to the Executive. 46 Under these circumstances, all
the legislators who had sought to assert the independence of the

Obong Akpaekong, et aI, Shady Deals, Newswatch (Nigeria), June 16, 2003 at 20.
Id.
Id.
40.
Id.
41. Id.
42.
Id.
43. Id.
44.
Wabara, for instance, said that the Senate under his presidency would not talk of
impeaching the President; See Abiodun Adeniyi, The Senate Won't Talk Impeachment,
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), June 15,2003 at 11.
45.
See John Abba-Ogbodo, Party Primaries and the Emerging Legislature, THE GUARDIAN
(Nigeria), Mar 4, 2003 at 8.
46. The list was called "unity list"; See also note 45, supra.
37.
38.
39.
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Legislative arm lost their nominations. 47 This remains a lesson to the
incumbent legislators.
Third, Nigeria is still at the "bread and butter" level of politics. In other
words, most people are concerned with subsistence; consequently, the
Executive, which controls the purse of the nation, exerts considerable
influence.
For example, the Executive applies direct monetary
inducements to direct the course of proceedings in the Legislature.48 In a
recent case, Professor Fabian Osuji, a former Minister for Education,
revealed that it is common practice for ministries to bribe legislators to
get their budgets passed. 49 The former Minister mobilized a total of W55
million from his ministry and the National Universities Commission to
bribe some members of the National Assembly, including the former
Senate President Adolphus Wabara, to ensure that the education
ministry's vote increased. 50 President Olusengun Obasanjo, in a national
broadcast, announced the dismissal of the Education Minister. 51 While
admitting the scam, the Minister said, inter alia, " ... what the Federal
Ministry of Education did ... is common knowledge and practice at all
levels of government - Federal, State and Local . . . ."52 Senator
Adolphus Wabara was forced to resign as Senate President. 53 The former
Senate President, the former Minister of Education, four senators, and a
member of the House of Representatives were arraigned before an Abuja
High Court for their involvement in the scam. 54 As demonstrated above,
the absence of true separation of powers and checks and balances in
Nigeria has rendered legislative oversight of the Executive illusory in
matters of corruption.
C.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AUDIT

One of the measures provided for in the Constitution for monitoring
corruption is the auditing process of public accounts. Section 125 of the
1999 Constitution provides as follows:

47.
48.

Id. At 8-9.
See The Ekwueme Panel's Report on the Crisis Between the Legislature and the Executive,
VANGUARD (Nigeria), Dec. 22, 2000, at 15. It was found that money actually changed hands in the
National Assembly for the purpose of removing the speaker.
49.
Alifa Daniel et. al. We Did It, Stop Denying, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Apr 12, 2005,
at 1-2.
50.
Id.
5!.
Id.
52. Id.
53.
Olu Ojewale, The Road Down The Valley, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria), Apr. 4,2005 at 24.
54.
Anza Phillips, Dockedfor Bribe, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria) Apr. 25,2005 at 17.
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(1) There shall be an Auditor-General for the federation
who shall be appointed in accordance with the
provisions of Section 86 of this Constitution.
(2) The public accounts of the federation and of all
offices and courts of the federation shall be audited and
reported on by the Auditor-General who shall submit his
reports to the National Assembly; and for that purpose,
the Auditor-General or any person authorized by him in
that behalf shall have access to all the books, records,
returns and other documents relating to those accounts.
(3) The Auditor-General shall have power to conduct
periodic checks of all government statutory
corporations, commlsszons, authorities, agencies,
including all persons and bodies established by an Act of
the National Assembly.
(4) The Auditor-General shall, within ninety days of
receipt of the Accountant-General's financial statement,
submit his reports under this Section to each House of
the National Assembly and each House shall cause the
reports to be considered by a Committee of the House of
the National Assembly, responsible for public accounts.
(5) In the exercise of his functions under the
Constitution, the Auditor-General shall not be subject to
the direction or control of any other authority or
person. 55

The essence of the public account process is to ensure that the
expenditure on projects and programs is in accordance with the sums and
projects the Legislature has appropriated. According to Rule 91(e)(2),(3)
and (4) of the standing rules of the House of Representatives,56 when the
Auditor-General's Report is laid before the House, the House must refer
it to the Public Accounts Committee of the House, who examines the
report and makes recommendations to the House. 57 The House is then

55. See CONSTITUTION, Cap. V, § 125 (1999) (Nigeria) (noting the position of Auditor-General
of the State).
56. The Senate and the State Houses of Assembly have similar rules.
57.
See the Standing Rules of both Houses of the National Assembly, available
at, www.nationalassembly.nigeria.com.
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required to consider the report of the Public Accounts Committee. 58
Similar provisions exist for the states.
Unfortunately, these provisions garner attention more often when they
are breached. With respect to the National Assembly, no AuditorGeneral's Report was received in 1999,2000 or 2001. 59 The then Acting
Auditor-General of the Federation, Pius Akubueze, and his immediate
successor, Joseph Ajiboye, failed to produce the requisite report as well. 60
When the Senate twice rejected the nomination of Mr. Ajiboye as the
substantive Auditor-General of the Federation, his second in command,
Vincent Azie, was appointed by President Obasanjo in an acting
capacity.
Mr. Azie, as the Acting Auditor-General of the Federation, submitted a
report to the National Assembly. From the report, a summary of the
amounts misappropriated by the various ministries are as follows:
Ministry
Co-operation and Integration
Africa

Amount Misappropriated
10

10,453,573,241.81

Power and Steel

4,394,649,602.19

Works and Housing

2,262,877,023.15

Defence

1,785,877,023.15

Education

1,265,272,388.99

Police Affairs

1,209,216,325.05

Information

664,124,321.46

Commerce

640,053,177.72

Health

465,103,959.12

58.

[d.

59. See Ita Jarnes-Evang, Legal Issues on Public Accounts and Appropriations, VANGUARD
(Nigeria), Aug. 9, 2002 at 27.
60.
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Editorial, Feb. 10, 2003 at 16 (considered the issuance of the
Auditor-General's Report by Azie as a watershed as it was the first of its kind).
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Industry
Total

356,064,369.12
23,860,732,145.2061

The audit report further disclosed that, while the Government recorded
estimated expenditure for the 2000 fiscal year audit period as N206.4
billion, the actual expenditure incurred for the year stood at N404.8
billion. 62 According to the report, the Government made payments out of
five revenue overheads amounting to N398.8 million, contrary to the
provision of the financial regulations, which stipulates that gross accruals
received must, in all cases, be accounted for in full. 63 The report also
indicted both the National Assembly and the Federal Judiciary.64
Immediately after the report was presented, the Federal Government,
through the then Minister for Information, Professor Jerry Gana, openly
castigated the acting Auditor-General and subsequently removed him
from office. 65 The Federal Government later explained that Mr. Azie was
not removed, but that his tenure of acting appointment had lapsed. 66 Mr.
Joseph Ajiboye, who had served as Acting Auditor-General, and whose
nomination by the President in 2002 as the substantive Auditor-General
was twice rejected by the Senate, was appointed as the Auditor-General
of the Federation67 and the new Senate confmned the appointment.
The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives
subsequently conducted public hearing sessions in which accounting
officers of various government departments questioned in the AuditorGeneral's report could provide explanations as to the queries. 68 The
Findings of the Public Accounts Committee disclosed grave financial
misconducts as those of the Auditor-General. The Committee, in a
summary of its findings, said, inter alia:
61. !d. at 26.
Id.
62.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), The Auditor-General's Repon: Matters Arising, Feb. 27, 2003
at 18.
66.
See Abiodun Adeleja, Gani Gives 2-Weeks' Ultimatum Over Azie, DAILY CHAMPION
(Nigeria), Feb. 28, 2003 at 3.
67. See note 65, supra, See also Government and the Auditor-General's Repon,
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Feb. 10,2003 at 16.
HOUSE COMM. ON PuB. ACCOUNTS, Summary of Findings and Recommendations on the
68.
Examination Conducted on Ministries and Agencies on Auditor-General's Reports on the Accounts
of the Federation (1998-2001); Author Unknown, Status Report on Some ParastataIs Mid-Session's
Report, THE NEWS MAGAZINE (Nigeria), Mar. 21, 2005 at 27.
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Although there is a remarkable improvement in the
management of public funds from what it used to be
prior to 1999, there is still tremendous degree of
recklessness and waste, even in the present state of
affairs.
Cases of theft, destruction of records, circumvention of
rules, connivance to defraud government by public
officials and their collaborators, etc are also still
rampan t ... 69
D.

THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC OFFICERS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION

The Code of Conduct is one of the mechanisms instituted by the
Constitution for identifying corruption among public officers. The Code
of Conduct is contained in the 5th schedule to the Constitution. 70 Under
Sections 172 and 209 of the Constitution, persons in both Federal and
State public services are required to conform to and observe the Code of
Conduce l The Code of Conduct requires a public officer to abstain from
putting himself in a position where his personal interests will conflict
with his official duties.72 The Code of Conduct also prohibits the
President, Vice-President, Governors, Deputy Governors, Ministers,
Commissioners, and members of the National and State Assemblies and
such other public officers as prescribed in law by the National Assembly
from maintaining or operating a foreign bank account. 73
A public officer is also prohibited from accepting property or benefits of
any kind for himself or on behalf of any other person as payment for any
commission or omission performed by him in the discharge of his
duties. 74 Under paragraph 6(2) of the Fifth Schedule, "the receipt by a
public officer of any gifts or benefits from commercial firms, business
enterprises, or persons who have contracts with the government shall be
presumed to have been received in contravention [of paragraph 6(1)]
unless the contrary is proved. "75

69.
Id. The Senate Committee on Public Accounts made similar findings. See THISDAY
(Nigeria), Senate Report on Public Accounts, Sept. 7, 2004 at 13.
70.
CONSTITUTION, Fifth Schedule (1999) (Nigeria).
71. Id. at Art. 172, 209.
72.
Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, 'I I.
73.
Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, 'I 3.
74.
Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, 'I 6.
75.
Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, '16(2).
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According to paragraph 7(b), the President or Vice-President, Governor
or Deputy Governor, Minister of the Government of the Federation or
Commissioner of the Government of a State, or any other public officer
who holds the office of a permanent Secretary or head of public
corporation, university, or other parastatal or organization, is prohibited
from "accepting any benefit of whatever nature from any company,
contractor, or businessman, or the nominee or agent of such person."76
Paragraph 8 prohibits bribery of public officers. 77 Paragraph 11(1)
requires that every public officer shall, immediately after taking the oath
of office, every four years thereafter, and at the end of his term of office,
submit to the Code of Conduct Bureau a written declaration of all his
(and those of his minor children) properties, assets, and liabilities. 78
"Any property or assets acquired by a public officer after the asset
declaration ... which is not fairly attributable to his income or gift, or
loan approved by [the] Code shall be deemed to have been acquired in
breach of [the] Code unless the contrary is proved."79 The spirit behind
the declaration of assets is for the system to record the material worth of
a public officer at the time of taking office, and compare the person's
material worth at the time of leaving office.
Under paragraph 3 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution, the Code of
Conduct Bureau is to receive the asset declarations, examine them to
ensure compliance with the Constitutional requirements, and "retain
custody of such declarations and make them available for inspection by
any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National
Assembly may prescribe."80 Unfortunately, the National Assembly has
not enacted any law prescribing such terms and conditions. Under these
circumstances, the Code of Conduct Bureau has refused to make asset
declarations available upon request to Nigerian citizens.s' This is a
serious impediment to the asset declaration mechanism because it is only
when they are made available to the citizens that false declarations can
be easily reported.
The Code of Conduct prohibits a public officer, except where he is
employed on a part-time basis, from engaging or participating in the
management or running of any private business, profession, or trade,
76. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part L 'lI 7(b).
77. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part L 'lI S.
7S. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part L 'lI 11(1).
79. Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part L 'lI 11(3).
SO.
Id. at Third Schedule, Part L 'lI 3(a) - (c).
SI.
Lemmy Ughegbe, Why We Can't Publish Pubic [Sic] Officers' Assets, By Conduct
Bureau, 1HE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), May 23, 2007 at 7.
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except farming. 82 However, this provision is essentially unenforced. The
country's wage policy appears to be fictional, and employees accept it
with a tacit understanding that they will pursue other income generating
opportunities. For instance, the minimum wage in the public service is
about N 6,500.00 per month (approximately $50.80).
In Okoye v. Santilli,83 the Supreme Court held that a public officer is
precluded by the Code of Conduct from engaging in any other business,
in violation of Section 20(1) of the Code of Conduct Bureau Act. 84
Accordingly, the Court held that a contract entered into by one of the
Defendants while still a public officer is illega1. 85 The majority of the
Supreme Court overruled the earlier case of Ogbuagu v. Ogbuagu86 in
which it was held that only the Code of Conduct Bureau and the Code of
Conduct Tribunal could entertain allegations of breach of the Code of
Conduct. 87

However, in Nwankwo v. Nwankwo,88 the Supreme Court clarified the
meaning of engaging in business when it held that the provision of
paragraph 2(b) of part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1979 Constitution is
not intended to prevent any public officer from acquiring an interest in a
business (e.g., a partnership).89 However, it did prohibit a public officer
from engaging or participating in the management and running of any
private business, profession or trade (to hold a managerial or other
position in such an undertaking or solely to run the same).90 The court
further reached the disturbing decision that the Code of Conduct does not
create a private right or interest for which a person could claim relief. 91
Its purpose, according to the Court, is to protect public interest, but a
private citizen has no locus standi to prosecute its contravention or claim

82. Constitution, Fifth Schedule, Part I, '112 (1999) (Nigeria).
83.
Okoye v. Santilli, [1994]4 N.W.L.R. (pt 338) 256,289 (Nigeria).
84. Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, (1990) Cap. 56 § 20(1) (Nigeria). The Act was
enacted under the regime of Ibrahim Babangida to energize the Constitutional provision on the Code
of Conduct for Public Officers. It is now an existing law within the meaning of Section 315 of the
1999 Constitution of Nigeria.
85. Okoye v Santilli (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt 388) 256.
86. Ogbuagu v. Ogbuagu [1981]2 N.C.L.R. 680 (Nigeria).
87. Id.
88.
Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, [1995] 5 N.W.L.R. (pt 394) 153 (Nigeria).
89.
!d.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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relief as a result thereof.92 The earlier case of Okoye V. Santilli93 was
neither cited to the court, nor did the court refer to it suo motu. 94
A Code of Conduct Bureau is established under the Third Schedule of
the Constitution to ensure compliance with and enforcement of the Code
of Conduct. Paragraph 15(1) of part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the
Constitution establishes a Code of Conduct Tribunal.95 The Tribunal has
the power to try cases of alleged infractions of the Code of Conduct and
to impose appropriate sanctions once the Tribunal determines a person is
guilty.96
The Code of Conduct has some advantages over other corruptionfighting mechanisms. First, it has Constitutional authority so the
constitutionality of its provisions cannot be challenged. Second, the
Officers of the Code of Conduct Bureau or Code of Conduct Tribunal
have secured tenures under the Constitution, which may make them
independent or impartial. 97
The Code of Conduct should not be subject to criminal or civil immunity
for the President, Vice-President, Governors and Deputy Governors
under Section 308 of the Constitution. Unfortunately, an Abuja High
Court has interpreted the Code of Conduct to be subject to the Immunity
Clause. 98 The former Governor of Plateau State, Joshua Dariye, was
arrested in 2004 by the Metropolitan Police in London for money
laundering. 99 When a charge was filed against him in Nigeria before the
Code of Conduct Tribunal, alleging that he had concealed a foreign
account, an Abuja Federal High Court held the trial to be
unconstitutional because it violated the Immunity Clause. 100
Additionally, the Code of Conduct has been crippled due to inadequate
funding and lack of enabling legislation to activate some of the
Constitutional provisions. The reason for crippling the Code of Conduct
is not far-fetched. Top members of the Executive and the Legislature are
92. [d.
93.
Okoye v. Santilli, [1994]4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 338) 256 (Nigeria).
94.
[d.
95.
CONSTITUTION, Fifth Schedule, Pan I, ,)[15(1) (1999) (Nigeria).
96. See [d. at Fifth Schedule, Pan I, 'll'll15 -18.
97. See [d. at Third Schedule, Pan I, ,)[4, Fifth Schedule, Pan I, ,)[16.
98.
Joshua Chibi Dariye v. Code of Conduct Bureau & 2 Ors Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CSI50712004
(Unreported Judgment of Adah J of Federal High Court, Abuja delivered on 6 December, 2004
at 1).
99.
See Shola Oshunkeye and Olukorede Yishau, There 'lmmuned' Excellencies, TELL
(Nigeria), Dec. 20, 2004 at 22-23. See also Wilson Uwujaren and Akin Orimolade, How Dariye
Had His Day, TELL (Nigeria), Nov. 29,2004 at 34.
100.
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Dec. 2, 2004, at I.
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known violators of the Code of Conduct. For instance, while the Code
prohibits the President, Vice-President and some other categories of
public officers from receiving gifts and donations from individuals or
corporations who are currently executing government contracts,
President Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku Abubakar received the
following donations towards their campaign for a second term:

SIN SOURCE
Friends of Atiku

AMOUNT (N)
1 billion

Aliko Dangote

250 million

Emeka Offor

200 million

21 PDP Governors

210 million

Group from Europe

1 million

Rivers friends of Obasanjo/Atiku

150 million

Grand Alliance

Boeing 727; two luxury buses

Construction companies in the country

200 million

Dr. Sampson Uche

50 million

PDP caucus in Senate

12 million

Principal Officers of the presidency

10.6 million

AVM Shekeri

10 million

First Atlantic Bank

10 million

Ministers

10 million

Otunba Fasawe

6.5 million

50 Government parastatals

5 million

PDP National Working Committee

5 million
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Dr. Ngozi Anyaegbunam

500,000

Dr. Gamaliel Onosode

100,000

Corporate Nigeria (Ltd. By Guarantee)

2 billion lOl

These donations were in clear violation of paragraph 7(b) of the Code of
Conduct. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court held that these
donations do not amount to the standard of a corrupt practice. In Yusufv.
Obasanjo lO2 (though in obiter), the Court effectively held that political
donations to President Obasanjo do not constitute undue influence, nor
do they connote a corruptible act. If the rule of law was strictly observed
in Nigeria, President Obasanjo would have been charged before the Code
of Conduct Tribunal for violating the Code of Conduct for Public
Officers.
Members of the Legislature also violate the provisions of the Code of
Conduct with impunity. A recent letter from the Code of Conduct
Bureau indicated that more than six months after they assumed office, 29
Senators and 48 members of the House of Representatives have yet to
declare their assets. 103 Yet Section 52 of the Constitution requires every
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives to declare his assets
before taking his seat. 104 One cannot understand why the Code of
Conduct Bureau chose to bring the matter before the clerk of the
National Assembly, rather than the Code of Conduct Tribunal, as
prescribed by the Constitution.

V. THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED
OFFENSES ACT 2000 REGIME
Upon coming to power as a civilian President, the first bill General
Obasanjo forwarded to the National Assembly was the Corrupt Practices
and Other Related Offenses Bill, which became the Corrupt Practices
and Other Related Offenses Act of 2000.105 The Act, however, did not
repeal the existing corruption laws. Rather, it recognized the power of
101.
Ehichioya Ezomon & Fred Okoror, Campaign Finance: Donations or Buying Up the
Democratic Process, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), lan. 24, 2003, at 23.
102.
Yusuf v. Obasanjo, [2003] 16 N.W.L.R. (pt. 847) 554,641-642 (Nigeria).
103.
Alifa Daniel & Azimazi Momoh limoh, 28 Senators, 48 Reps Yet to Declare Assets, Says
Bureau, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Dec. 12, 2003, at 64.
104. CONSTITUTION, Art. 52 (1999) (Nigeria).
105. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5 (Nigeria).
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the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offenses Commission
("ICPC"), created by the Act, to prosecute persons who violate existing
laws on corruption. 106 The following discussion addresses the offenses
created by the Act.

A. GRATIFICATION BY AN OFFICIAL
According to Section 8( 1) of the Act, it is an offense for any person to
ask for, receive, or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for himself
or for any other person, or to agree or to attempt to receive or obtain any
property or benefit of any kind for himself or for any other person on
account of:
a) anything already done or omitted to be done, or for
any favour or disfavour already shown to any person by
himself in the discharge of his official duties or in
relation to any matter connected with the junctions,
affairs or business of a Government department, or
corporate body or other organisation or institution in
which he is serving as an official; or
b) anything to be afterwards done or omitted to be
done or favour or disfavour to be afterwards shown to
any person, by himself in the discharge of his official
duties or in relation to any such matter as aforesaid. .. 107

The punishment for this offense of official corruption is seven years
imprisonment. 108 Section 8(2) creates the presumption of a corrupt gift
against a public officer, which is similar to Section 98 of the Criminal
Code. 109 However, while the opening words of Section 98 read "Any
public official", Section 8 employs the phrase "Any person."11O The
intention may be to widen the scope of Section 8 of the Act. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Biobaku v. Police ll1 found that the purpose of a similar
provision under the Criminal Code was to address the receipt or offer of
some benefit as a reward or inducement to sway or deflect a person
employed in the public service from the honest and impartial discharge
of his duties.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

[d. at § 26(2)
[d. at § 8(1).
[d.
[d. at § 8(2); see Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. 77, § 98 (Nigeria).
[d.

Ill.

Biobaku
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Section 9 of the Act extends liability to the giver or promisor of a bribe
punishable by seven years imprisonment. 112 It is an offense, under
Section 10 of the Act, for any person to ask for bribes for himself or for
any other person on account of something done or to be done or omitted
to be done by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties.ll3
B.

FRAUDULENT ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY

According to Section 12 of the Act:

[alny person who, being employed in the public service,
knowingly acquires or holds, directly or indirectly,
otherwise than as a member of a registered joint stock
company consisting of more than twenty (20) persons, a
private interest in any contract, agreement or investment
emanating from or connected with the department or
office in which he is employed or which is made on
account of the public service, is guilty of an offense and
shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for seven
(7) years. 114
This provision is aimed at preventing people in official positions from
awarding contracts to themselves or to organizations in which they have
substantial interest. Moreover, Section 12 is similar to Section 161 of the
Criminal Code. 115
C.

FRAUDULENT RECEIPT OF PROPERTY

Based on Section 13 of the Act, it is an offense for any person to receive
anything which has been obtained by means of a felony or misdemeanor,
or by means of any act done in a place outside Nigeria, which, if done in
Nigeria, would have constituted a felony or misdemeanor, and which is
an offense under the laws in force in the place where it was done,
provided that the person knows same to be so obtained. 116 Section 13 is
similar to the first paragraph of Section 427 of the Criminal Code. 117

112.
II3.
II4.
II5.
116.
II7.

Conupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 9 (Nigeria).
Id. at § 10.
Id. at § 12.
Id.
Conupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 13 (Nigeria).
Id.
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MAKING FALSE STATEMENT OR RETURN

Section 16 makes it an offense for any officer in charge of receiving or
managing property to knowingly furnish any false statements or returns
with respect to any money or property within his possession, control or
care, lIS Punishment for the offense is seven years imprisonment. 119
E.

GRATIFICATION BY OR THROUGH AGENTS

Section 17 prescribes a punishment of five years imprisonment for
corruptly offering or giving a gift or consideration to an agent as an
inducement for doing or omitting to do any act or thing in relation to his
principal's business: 2o The Section also prescribes punishment for an
agent who, with intent to deceive his principal, knowingly uses any
receipt, account, or document in which his principal is interested and
which contains a false, erroneous or defective statement, and which to
his knowledge is intended to mislead his principal or any other person. 121
F.

BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICER

Section 18 of the Act prohibits and punishes any person from offering,
soliciting or aiding a public officer in accepting any gratification as an
inducement or reward for the following:

(a) Voting or abstaining from voting at any meeting of
the public body in favour or against any measure,
resolution or question submitted to the public body;
(b) Peiforming or abstaining from peiforming or aiding
in procuring, expediting, delaying, hindering or
preventing the peiformance of any official act;
(c) Aiding in procuring or preventing the passing of any

vote or the granting of any contract, award, recognition
or advantage infavour of any person. ..

118.
119.
120.

121.

Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 16 (Nigeria).
/d.
/d. at § 17.
/d.
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(d) shall. . . be guilty of an offense and shall on
conviction be liable to five (5) years imprisonment with
hard labour. 122

Section 18(a) above is intended to catch members of the Executive, who
use financial inducements to dictate the course of proceedings in the
Legislature. The Section also applies to legislators who accept such
inducements, or members of contract-awarding public bodies who
receive inducements to vote in favor of a particular bidder.
G.

USING OFFICE FOR GRATIFICATION

Section 19 of the Act provides that:
Any public officer who uses his office or pOSltlOn to
gratify or confer any corrupt or unfair advantage upon
himself or any relation or associate of the public officer
or any other public officer shall be guilty of an offense
and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for
five (5) years without option offine. 123

This provision covers cases of discretional abuse in the distribution of
public benefits. However, it is only when the abuse is for the advantage
of the particular person, his relation, his associate, or any other public
officer, that liability under the provision will arise.
H.

FORFEITURE OF GRATIFICATION

Section 20 of the Act is a praiseworthy novelty in criminal law of the
country relating to corruption. The Section provides as follows:
Without prejudice to any sentence of imprisonment
imposed under this Act, a Public Officer or other person
found guilty of soliciting, offering or receiving
gratification shall forfeit the gratification and pay a fine
of not less than five times the sum or value of the
gratification which is the subject-matter of the offense
where such gratification is capable of being valued or is

122.
123.

/d. at § 18.
Id. at § 19.
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of a pecuniary nature, or ten thousand Naira, whichever
is the higher. 124
I.

DUTY TO REpORT BRIBERY TRANSACTIONS

Section 23 is of special significance. Section 23(1) requires any public
officer to whom any gratification is given, promised, or offered, to report
such transaction to the nearest officer of the ICPC or police officer. '25
Section 23(2) also provides that "any person from whom any
gratification has been solicited or obtained, or from whom an attempt has
been made to obtain such gratification shalL .. , at the earliest opportunity
thereafter, report such soliciting or obtaining, or attempt to obtain the
gratification" to the nearest Officer of the Commission or a police
officer. 126 Under Section 23(3), "any person who fails, without
reasonable excuse, to comply with subsections (1) and (2) [of Section 23]
shall be guilty of an offense and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not
exceeding N 100,000 or imprisoned for a term not exceeding two years
or to both fine and imprisonment."127

J.

BRIBERY FOR GIVING ASSISTANCE WITH REGARD To A CONTRACT

Section 22 catalogues all aspects of corruption in relation to contract
awards. Any person who gives money or any other advantage to a public
servant and in return is awarded a contract is guilty of an offense
punishable by seven years imprisonment. 128 The same punishment awaits
a public servant who, without lawful excuse, solicits or accepts such
advantage arising from contract awards. '29 Inflation of contract prices or
over-invoicing is now punishable by seven years imprisonment and a
fine of N 1,000,000. 130
K.

CONCEALMENT OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED THROUGH GRA TIFICATION

Concealment of any property obtained in contravention of Sections 10,
11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20, whether within or outside the country is
an offense punishable with five years imprisonment. '31

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at § 20.
ld.at§23(1).
ld. at § 23(2).
ld. at § 23(3).
ld. at § 22.
Id.
ld.
ld.at§24.
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FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY UPON PROSECUTION FOR AN OFFENSE

Section 47 is significant in preventing unjust enrichment of a person,
even when the person has not been convicted, if the prosecution failed to
meet the requisite standard of proof (in criminal cases) or for any other
reason. The Section provides:
(1) In any prosecution for an offense under [the] Act,

the Court shall make an order for the forfeiture of any
property which is proved to be the subject-matter of the
offense or to have been used in the commission of the
offense where
(a) The offense is proved against the accused; or
(b) The offense is not proved against the accused but the
court is satisfied:
(i) that the accused is not the true and lawful owner of
such property; and
(ii) that no other person is entitled to the property as a

purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration.
(2) Where the offense is proved against the accused or
the property referred to in subSection (1) has been
disposed of, or cannot be traced, the court shall order
the accused to pay as a penalty a sum which is
equivalent to the amount of the gratification or is, in the
opinion of the court, the value of the gratification
received by the accused, and any such penalty shall be
recoverable as a fine. 132
M. INVESTIGATION OF THE PRESIDENT OR GOVERNOR
Section 52 of the Act provides that when allegations of corruption are
made against the President, Vice President, Governor or Deputy
Governor, an independent counsel appointed by the Chief Justice of the
Federation will investigate.133 The independent counsel's report should
be forwarded to the National Assembly or the relevant State House of
Assembly. While Section 308 of the Constitution confers immunity on
132.
133.

Id. at § 47.
Id. at § 52.
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these Chief State Executives from civil or criminal process while in
office,134 the Court of Appeals held in Fawehinmi v. Bola Tinubu l35 that
the police have the discretion to decide whether to investigate a State
Executive while in office. 136
N.

INDEPENDENT CORRUPT
OFFENSES COMMISSION

PRACTICES

AND

OTHER

RELATED

Section 3 of the Act establishes the ICPC. 137 The functions of the ICPC
are described in Section 6 of the Act as follows:
6.

It shall be the duty of the Commission:

(a) where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that
any person has conspired to commit or has attempted to
commit or has committed an offense under this Act or
any other law prohibiting corruption, to receive and
investigate any report of the conspiracy to commit,
attempt to commit or the commission of such offense
and, in appropriate cases, to prosecute the offenders;
(b) to examine the practices, systems and procedures of
public bodies and where, in the opinion of the
Commission, such practices, systems or procedures aid
or facilitate fraud or corruption, to direct and supervise
a review of them;
(c) to instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency or
parastatals on ways by which fraud or corruption may
be eliminated or minimised by such officer, agency or
parastatal;
(d) to advise heads of public bodies of any changes in
practices, systems or procedures compatible with the
effective discharge of the duties of the public bodies as
the Commission thinks fit to reduce the likelihood or
incidence of bribery, corruption, and related offenses;

134. CONSTITUTION, Art. 308 (1999) (Nigeria). The Supreme Court affirmed the position in
IMB Securities PLC v. Tinubu, [2(01)45 W.R.N. 1,22 (Nigeria).
135.
Fawehinmi v. Bola Tinubu [2(02)7 N.W.L.R. 21 (Nigeria).
136. Id.
137. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 3 (Nigeria).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

25

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

124

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XIV
(e) to educate the public on and against bribery,
corruption and related offenses; and
(j) to enlist and foster public support
corruption. 138

tn

combating

The ICPC has broad authority to search, seize, investigate, inspect, and
examine: persons,139 records of financial institutions, shared accounts,
and the contents of safe deposit boxes. l40 An officer of the ICPC, when
investigating or prosecuting a case of corruption, has all the powers and
immunities of a police officer under the Police Act and other laws
empowenng and protecting the Police and other law enforcement
agents. 141
The constitutionality of the Act was at issue in A.G. Ondo State V. A.G.
Federation. 142 The Attorney-General of Ondo State filed an originating
summons in the Supreme Court against the Attorney-General of the
Federation and joined the Attorney Generals of the other 35 States as codefendants in the suit. The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a determination of
whether the Act was valid and enforceable as law enacted by the
National Assembly and applicable in every State of the Federal Republic
, of Nigeria (including Ondo State).143 The plaintiff also sought an order
for a permanent injunction, restraining the Attorney-General of
Federation from exercising any powers vested in him by the Constitution
or any other law respecting criminal offenses created by provisions
contained in the Act. l44 The plaintiff contended, inter alia, that the Act
deals with matters which are neither in the Exclusive nor Concurrent
Legislative list and, therefore, the enactment of the Act was ultra vires
the Legislative powers of the National Assembly and, consequently,
unconstitutional. The National Assembly can only legislate with respect
to matters on either the Exclusive or Concurrent Legislative list. 145
The Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that the Act was
constitutional. l46 The Court held that since, by virtue of Section 4(2) of
the 1999 Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to make
laws for the Federation respecting any matter included in the Exclusive
138.
139.

140.
141.

142.
143.
144.

145.
146.

[d. at §§ 6(a) - (t).
[d. at §§ 27-41.
[d..at §§ 37(2) - (3).
[d. at § 5(1).
A.G. Ondo State V. A.G. Federation, [2002]9 N.W.L.R. (pt. 772) 222 (Nigeria).
[d.
[d.
Id. at 286-287.
[d.
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Legislative list, it follows that the National Assembly is empowered to
legislate under item 60(a) of the Exclusive Legislative list for the
purpose of establishing and regulating the ICPC. 147
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held some Sections of the Act
unconstitutional. The Court held that the power given by Section 35 of
the Act to the ICPC to arrest and detain a person indefinitely until the
person complies with the summons, violates the provision of Section 35
of the 1999 Constitution, which guarantees the fundamental right to
personal liberty. 148 Section 35 of the Constitution provides that a person
arrested for a criminal offense, must be charged within a reasonable time
or released on bail. I49 Reasonable time is defined as: 24 hours, provided
there is a court of competent jurisdiction within a 40 kilometer radius
from the place of arrest, and 48 hours, where there is no such court
within that radius. 150
The Supreme Court also held Section 26(3) of the Act unconstitutional
because it infringes on separation of power principles. 151 Section 26(3)
prescribes that prosecution of an offense, under the Act, be concluded
and judgment delivered within 90 working days of commencing
According to the Supreme Court, it is a direct
prosecution. 152
interference with the Judiciary for the National Assembly to prescribe
when the court should conclude particular matters. 153 With due respect,
this proposition cannot be supported. The Supreme Court said the
Section is unconstitutional without citing any provision of the
Constitution the Section violates. l54 Section 26(3) of the Act finds
support in Section 36(4) of the Constitution, which provides that any
person who is charged with a criminal offense should be tried within a
reasonable time. 155
The Supreme Court relied upon the case of Unongo v. Aku, which must
be understood within its context. 156 In that case, the National Assembly
enacted the Electoral Act of 1982.157 Under the Electoral Act, Section
147. Id. at 304.
148. Id. at 309-310.
149. CONSTITUTION, Art. 35 (1999) (Nigeria).
150.
A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation, [2002] 9 N.W.L.R. (pt. 772) 222 (Nigeria).
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. at 309-310.
Id.
154.
155. Corrupt Practices and other Related Offenses Act, (2000) No.5, § 26(3) (Nigeria);
CONSTITUTION, Art. 36(4) (1999) (Nigeria).
156.
Unongo v. Aim, [1983]2 S.C.N.L.R. 332 (Supreme Court of Nigeria).
157.
Id.
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129(3) provided that election petition proceedings before a high court
had to be completed no later than thirty days from the election. 15s
Section 119(4) required that such a petition had to be presented to the
competent high court within fourteen days of conducting the election. 159
Under Section 135, a reply to the petition had to be filed by the
Respondent no later than six days after the date on which the petition
was served on the Respondent. l60 Finally, Section 139(1) required the
Registrar of the Court to give at least ten days notice before the day fixed
for the trial. 161 It was the contention of Chief F.R.A. Williams, arguing
for the Appellant, that by applying the above provisions, where an
election result becomes known on the very day the election takes place,
if all the actions to be taken by the parties to a petition under Sections
119(4) and 135 of the Electoral Act were carried out on the last day
allowed in each case, and allowance was made for the mandatory ten
days under Section 139 before the hearing of the petition, then the trial
court must dispose of the petition on the very day it was fixed for
hearing. 162 The Supreme Court rightly held that the provisions of
Sections 129(3) and 1·:0(2) by implication ousted the jurisdiction of the
court, constituting an infringement of the right to a fair hearing and a
breach of the entrenched separation of powers in the Constitution, and
consequently were unconstitutional and void. 163
This case cannot be the authority for a general proposition that the
Legislature is not competent to set the time period within which a case
must be decided. The Constitution, in Section 294(1), provided that
constitutionally-established courts shall deliver judgments no later than
ninety days after the conclusion of final addresses. l64 Speedy trial is
always an aspect of a fair hearing. 165 The Constitution also empowers the
National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly to prescribe the
practice and procedure of the various courts in Nigeria. 166 The Unongo
decision was only justified because there were inherent contradictions in
the provisions of the Electoral Act of 1982 making it impracticable for
any court to comply with the limitation period. Speedy trials in
corruption cases are essential because witnesses may die or move outside
the country, the res (subject matter of litigation) may be destroyed, and

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

ld.
[d.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 347.

164.

CONSTITUTION, Art. 294(1) (1999) (Nigeria).

165.
166.

See Ariori v. Eiemo, [1983]1 S.C.N.L.R. 1 (Supreme Court of Nigeria).
See CONSTITUTION, Art. 236,248 (1999) (Nigeria).
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the government may change resulting in a new policy or change in the
law. The menace of corruption in Nigeria is such that the public will
want to know the outcome of cases as soon as possible. Furthermore,
from the accused's point of view, allegations of corruption carry such a
social stigma that an innocent person would want their name cleared as
soon as possible.

VI. CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE INDEPENDENT
CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES
ACT 2000 REGIME
Some of the criticisms of the regime created by the Act relate to the
Act's provisions, while others relate to enforcement. A renowned
Professor of Criminal Law, Cyprian O. Okonkwo,167 has offered some
constructive criticisms of the Act as follows. The Act has no provision
for questioning a person who maintains a standard of living above what
commensurates with his legitimate income, or, for punishing him if he
cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the additional income. 168
The Act also has no provision for encouraging and protecting
whistleblowers. 169 A whistleblower's law is a desideratum for any
meaningful fight against corruption.
Professor Okonkwo further observes that the punishments imposed for
the various offenses of corruption are far from severe. 170 According to
him, corruption is a special malady in Nigeria and calls for very severe
punishment. 171
The maximum punishment should be life
imprisonment.172 The judge will then be in a position to determine
whether to impose the maximum sentence or a number of years
depending on whether there are aggravating or mitigating factors in a
particular case. 173 However, the eminent Professor was short of
suggesting a minimum sentence.
In addition to the comments by Professor Okonkow, it is submitted that
in the area of enforcement, the Act leaves much to be desired. A survey
conducted in 2001 indicated that corruption increased in Nigeria a year

167.
Nigeria,
168.
169.
170.
171.

Cyprian Okechukwu Okonkwo, Legal and Institutional Mechanisms Against Corruption in
at 288-290 (Centus Chima Nweze ed., 2002).
Id.
Id.
[d.

JUSTICE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

172.

[d.
[d.

173.

Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

29

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XIV

128

after the establishment of the ICPC. 174 While acts of corruption are
reported in the media every day, little or nothing is done by the ICPC.
Before the last general elections, the ICPC informed Nigerians that it was
investigating allegations of corruption against eight incumbent
Governors who were aspiring for a second term. 175 Until now, the
outcomes of these investigations have not been disclosed. In the
meantime, the Governors have been sworn in for a second term and are
enjoying immunity under the Constitution.
In 2002, then-Senate President Anyim Pius Anyim, asked the court to
order the ICPC to investigate the allegation of corruption he had made
against the National Chairman of the ruling People's Democratic Party,
Dr. Audu Ogbe. 176 Anyim informed Nigerians that Dr. Audu Ogbe had
corruptly demanded the sum of N120 million from him.177 Dr. Ogbe
admitted to making the demand but said the money was required to
organize a retreat for members of the PDP. 178 This demand amounts to
corruption par excellence. A political party should not use public funds
to organize retreats for party members. The amount demanded was so
large that it was impossible to expect the Senate President to raise the
amount from his personal purse. In March 2003, the Chairman of the
ICPC, the Hon. Justice Akanbi, informed Nigerians that Dr. Audu Ogbe
was under investigation by the Commission. 179 Presently, nothing has
been revealed in regards to the outcome of the investigation. Anyim,
also made a report to the ICPC that Senator Arthur Nzeribe had
defrauded the Senate to the tune of N22.8 million.180 The ICPC did
nothing about the report. Senator Mamman Ali revealed on the floor of
the Senate that he and some other senators were given N3 million each to
discontinue the impeachment of President Obasanjo.181 Senator Nzeribe
corroborated the story when he declared that he had collected N60
million for himself and his supporters for the same purpose.1 82 There
were also numerous other open confessions of corruption in which the
ICPC failed to act, in spite of Section 27(3) of the Act. Section 27(3)
174. See INST. FOR DEV. RESEARCH, NIGERIA GoVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION SURVEY STUDY:
OVERALL SUMMARY REPORT 8 (June 2003) (Nigeria), available at,
hnp:llwww.accountabilitynigeria.org/reports/nigeria%200vera1l.pdf.
175.
Abraham Ogbodo, Governors, Corruption and the Next Election, THE GUARDIAN
(Nigeria), Jan. 19, 2003 at 18.
176.
Lenuny Ughegbe, N120m Retreat: Anyim Gets Court's Order for Ogbeh's Probe,
VANGUARD (Nigeria), July 10, 2002 at I.
177.
/d.
178.

Id.

179.
Gbolahan Gbadamosi, Anti-graft Panel Probes Ogbeh, Agunloye, Others, THE GUARDIAN
(Nigeria), Mar. 21, 2003 at 1,4.
180.
Shola Oshunkeye, The Caging of the Speaker, 'fELL (Nigeria), Nov. II, 2002 at 33.
181.
Chinenye Nwabueze, Dirty Linen, THE WEEK (Nigeria), Nov. 25, 2002 at 19

182.

Id.
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empowers an officer of the Commission to commence investigation
proceedings, when there is reason to suspect the Commission of an
offense under the Act. The officer may exercise all the powers of
investigation provided by the Act or by any other law. ls3
Contrary to this authority, the ICPC has only taken action against
perceived opponents of the President. When the National Assembly
attempted to commence impeachment proceedings against President
Obasanjo during his first tenure in office, the ICPC went on the war path
against the leadership of the National Assembly. In a letter to the
President, the former Senate President Anyim said:
I regret to inform you that it is clear to us now that while
we have clear intentions that the ICPC should be used to
fight corruption, we did not know that the presidency's
intention is to use ICPC to protect its corrupt members
on one hand, and to use ICPC to fight real and
perceived enemies of Mr. President. 184
It was against this background that the National Assembly had to pass

the ICPC Amendment Act of 2002. Explaining the rationale for the
ICPC Amendment Act, the Senate Committee on ICPC said:
Past events have clearly proved that the Executive (sic)
intention is to use the ICPC to fight perceived and real
enemies through blackmail, harassment and witch
hunting. Most worrisome is the situation where the
Executive has carefully and methodically weakened all
other Agencies of Government like the Auditor-General
of the Federation and Code of Conduct Bureau, whose
junctions are critical to the fight against corruption, so
as to use the ICPC to protect its corrupt members and
friends. In the case of the Auditor General of the
Federation, whose functions are essential to the fight
against corruption, this government has conspicuously
refused to appoint a substantive Auditor General for
over one year, and the Acting Auditor General, Mr. Azie,
who ventured to provide an honest and comprehensive
report about the financial rot and corruption in the
system was shamelessly sacked, abused and removed
from office without delay. The Code of Conduct Bureau
183.
184.

[d.
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Dec. 24, 2002 at 1-2.
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has since the inception of this government been
systematically paralyzed through lack of release of
budgeted funds for the Agency. It is absolutely obvious
to every fair minded Nigerian, particularly objective
public officers and politicians at all levels of
government, that the Obasanjo government has
manipulated the ICPC with the active connivance of the
Commission to inadvertently (sic) convert the ICPC into
a tool to silence, blackmail, threaten, harass, coarse,
[sic] whip in line, guarantee loyalty and witch hunt
opponents while protecting friends, no matter how
corrupt or devious they are. 185

The following are highlights of the amendments introduced by the ICPC
Amendment Act of 2002, as explained by the Senate Committee on
ICPC. Appointment of the Chairman of the ICPC is to be made by the
Chief Justice of Nigeria (and no longer the President) on the
recommendation of the National Judicial Council (NJC) , subject to
confirmation by the Senate. 186 The Chairman must be a serving (no
longer retired) Justice of the Court of Appeals and his conditions of
service must be in line with the conditions of service in the Judiciary.187
The power to appoint the Secretary for the Commission is vested in the
Commission. 188 The Commission is required to adopt its own rules of
procedure for its business conduct. 189 The power to prosecute offenses
under the Act is vested in the Attorney-General of the Federation. l90
Furthermore, a close look at the Amendment Act shows that the powers
of the ICPC were diminished in many respects. The significance of the
amendments include: the vesting of the power to appoint the Chairman
of the Commission on the Chief Justice of Nigeria, and the power to
appoint the Secretary by the Commission itself.191 These provisions will
enhance the independence of the Commission and restore public
confidence in the Commission. One amendment that must be severely
criticized is the divesting of power of prosecution from the Commission,
and vesting it solely in the Attorney-General. Rather, the Commission

185.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Advertorial, SUNDAY CHAMPION (Nigeria),
Mar. 9, 2003 at 38.
186. [d.
187. [d.
188. [d.
189. [d.
190. Id. at 39; See also http://www.thisdayonline.comlarchive.php.
191. [d.
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should be allowed to exercise the power concurrently with the AttorneyGeneral.
On the other hand, some actions of the ICPC which should be
commended are the investigation of the former Minister of Labour and
Productivity, Husaini Akwanga, and five other persons over their alleged
involvement in the $214 million National Identity Card Scheme scam. 192
President Obasanjo announced the sacking of the Minister during the
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Abuj a. 193 The Minister
and the two other accused were charged in 2003 but the trial has not yet
been concluded. 194 A second noteworthy achievement is the recent
arraignment of two Senior Advocates of Nigeria and two others for
spending N21 million on bribing INEC officials. 195

VII. ARTICLE II: THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
CRIMES COMMISSION
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (hereinafter "EFCC")
was established in 2002 pursuant to Act No.5 of that year. 196 The Act
was later repealed and replaced by the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (Establishment) Act of 2004.197 Economic and Financial
Crimes are defined in Section 46 of the Act to mean non-violent criminal
and illicit activity committed with the objective of illegally earning
wealth individually, in a group, or in an organized manner, thereby
violating existing legislation governing the economic activities of
government and its administration. 198 Financial crimes include any form
of "fraud,
narcotic
drug
trafficking,
money
laundering,
embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt malpractices,
illegal arms deal [sic], smuggling, human trafficking and child labour,
illegal oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange
malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual
property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and
'b' d goods.... "199
prohlite

192.
George Oji & Cletus Akwaya, Corruption: Labour Minister, Akwanga, Sacked, THISDAY
(Nigeria), Dec. 5, 2003 at I.
193. Id.
194. Fola Adekeye, Confessions Of Afolabi, Akwanga And Others, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria),
Apr. 26, 2004 at 14.
195.
Mikail Mumuni, This Is Our Own Storey, TELL (Nigeria), May 30, 2005 at 24.
196.
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, (2002) § I (Nigeria).
197.
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, (2004) § 1 (Nigeria).
198. Id. at § 46.
199. Id.
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Section 6 of the Act stipulates the functions of the Commission as
follows:

a. the enforcement and the due administration of the
provisions of this Act;
b. the investigation of all financial crimes including
advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting,
illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent
encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit
cardfraud, contract scam, etc;
c. the co-ordination and enforcement of all economic
and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions
conferred on any other person or authority;

d. the adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze,
confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist
activities, economic and financial crimes related
offenses or the properties the value of which
corresponds to such proceeds;
e. the adoption of measures to eradicate
commission of economic and financial crimes;

the

f

the adoption of measures which includes
coordinated preventive and regulatory actions,
introduction and maintenance of investigative and
control techniques on the prevention of economic and
financial related crimes;
g. the facilitation of rapid exchange of scientific and
technical information and the conduct of joint
operations geared towards the eradication of economic
and financial crimes;
h. the examination and investigation of all reported
cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to
identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups
involved;
i. the determination of the extent of financial loss and
such other losses by government, private individuals or
organizations;
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collaborating with government bodies both within
and outside Nigeria carrying on functions wholly or in
part analogous with those of the Commission
concerning -

j.

i.
the identification, determination of the
whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of
being involved in economic and financial crimes,
ii. the movement of proceeds or properties derived
from the commission of economic and financial and
other related crimes;
iii. the exchange of personnel or other experts,
iv. the establishment and maintenance of a system for
monitoring international economic and financial
crimes in order to identify suspicious transactions
and persons involved,
v. maintaining data, statistics, records and reports
on person [sic], organizations, proceeds, properties,
documents or other items or assets involved in
economic andfinancial crimes;
vi. undertaking research and similar works with a
view to determining the manifestation, extent,
magnitude and effects of economic and financial
crimes and advising government on appropriate
intervention measures for combating same
k. dealing with matters connected with the extradition,
deportation and mutual legal or other assistance
between Nigeria and any other country involving
economic and financial crimes;
l. The collection of all reports relating [to] suspicious
financial transactions, analyse and disseminate them to
all relevant government agencies;

m. taking charge of, supervlsmg,
controlling,
coordinating all the responsibilities, junctions and
activities relating to the current investigation and
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prosecution of all offenses connected with or relating to
economic and financial crimes;
n. the coordination of all existing, economic and
financial crime investigating units in Nigeria;
o. maintaining a liaison with [the] office of the
Attorney-General of the Federation, the Nigerian
Customs Service, the Immigration and Prison Service
Board, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigeria Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the National Drug Law
Enforcement Agency, all government security and law
enforcement agencies and such other financial
supervisory institutions involved in the eradication of
economic and financial crimes;
p. carrying out and sustaining rigorous public
enlightenment campaign[s] against economic and
financial crimes within and outside Nigeria and;
q. carrying out such other activities as are necessary
or expedient for the full discharge of all or any of the
functions conferred on it under this Act. 200

Within the short period of its existence, the EFCC has recorded
tremendous achievements. The Commission, between May 2003 and
June 2004, recovered money and assets derived from crime worth over
700 rnillion. 201 The Commission has arrested and is detaining more than
500 notorious Advance Fee Fraud202 kingpins, most of whom are
standing trial. 203 Moreover, the Commission has investigated and
prosecuted some high profile cases of corruption, including the case of
the former Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun, who was
convicted. 204 The fiery and indefatigable Chairman of the Commission,
Nuhu Ribadu, is credited for the achievements of the Commission. 205
200. Id. at § 6.
201.
The Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
Bangkok, Thailand, Apr., 18 - 25, 2005, Synergies and Responses: Strategic Alliances in Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice, at 38; see also www.efccc.nigeria.org.
202.
The offense is otherwise known as "Obtaining by False Pretence".
203.
See www.efcc.nig.org.
204. Id.; See also Bamidele Johnson, Tafa 011 Trial, THE NEWS (Nigeria), Apr. 11,2005
at 21-22.
205.
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria) selected Ribadu as Man of the year 2007 as a result of his
personal commitment to the anti-corruption struggle in Nigeria. See Eluem Emeka Izeze, Man Of
The Year, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Dec. 20, 2007 at 1,2. TELL (NIGERIA) Magazine described
him as the unusual Crime Fighter. See Olu Ojewale, The Unusual Crime Fighter, TELL(NIGERIA),
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Nevertheless, it is a well-known secret that the President's approval is
required before any top political office holder can be investigated.

VIII. THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL
CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA

WILL

TO

FIGHT

No anti-corruption mechanism or strategy will succeed without strong
leadership and political will. Political leadership is required to both set
an example and to demonstrate that no one is above the law. Unless
clear and unambiguous signals of support emanate from the top, those
responsible for administering and enforcing crucial aspects of the
country's national integrity system may feel inhibited. 206 Political will is
therefore a critical and paramount starting point to achieve a sustainable
and effective anti-corruption strategy. According to the National AntiCorruption Strategy and Action Plan for Tanzania, political will involves
building legitimacy, credibility, and broad-based political support and
compliance both in society and within government. 207 Political will and
leadership, broadly conceived, involves leaders in all walks of life political leaders, professional groups, the private sector, trade unions,
religious institutions, and other civil society groups, etc. However, the
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of government are the main
focus of the issue of political will.
A.

THE EXECUTIVE
CORRUPTION

AND

THE

POLITICAL

WILL

TO

COMBAT

General Obasanjo, from the beginning, was never committed to fighting
corruption. As noted earlier, when General Mohammed was assassinated
in 1976 and General Obasanjo took power, he abrogated the Corrupt
Practices Decree No. 38 of 1975 and discontinued General Mohammed's
anti-corruption program. 208 This action brought an end to the war against
corruption initiated by General Mohammed.

Jan. 16,2006 at 18. THISDAY (NIGERIA), Jan. 1,2007 at 7 also selected him as one of the best
persons of the year 2007.
206. See JEREMY POPE, TI SOURCE BOOK 2000: CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS
OF A NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM 47 (2000).
207.
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN
FOR TANZANIA 10 (1999) (Tanzania). available at,
http://www.ipocafrica.org/pdfuploads/the%20united%20republic%20anticorruption%200f%20tanzania%20the%20nati_003.pdf.
208.
The Decree was repealed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigerian (Certain
Consequential Repeals, etc.) Decree 1979 before Obasanjo handed over to the civilian regime in
1979; See NWABUEZE, B. O. Mll.JTARY RULE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 70
(mADAN, NIG: SPECTRUM BOOKS, 1992).
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On Obasanjo's return to power in 1999 as a civilian President, the story
is almost the same, except for some recent actions. In 2000, there was an
allegation made on the National Assembly floor that the Federal
Executive bribed some members of the National Assembly with the sum
of N500,000 each, to induce them to vote for the impeachment of the
former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Alhaji Umar Ghali
Na' Abba. 209 Part of the money was physically tendered on the floor of
the National Assembly. The panel set up by the ruling PDP to look into
the crisis between the Executive and the Legislature, found that "money
must have indeed changed hands for the purpose of removing the
Speaker."210
In 2002, to start off the impeachment move against the Senate President,
Anyim Pius Anyim, some Senators alleged on the floor of the Senate that
the Executive was distributing N3 million per Senator to sway them to
vote against the impeachment move.2l1
In 1999, President Obasanjo paid Nll billion to the construction
company Julius Berger, even though the amount was not in the approved
budget for that year. 212 His subsequent explanation of making the
payment in order to save jobs was unconvincing. In February 2003,
President Obasanjo received over N2 billion in cash and other material
donations (including an aircraft) from individuals and corporations that
had business dealings with the Government, in contravention of
paragraph 6(2) of the Code of Conduct contained in part 1 of the Fifth
Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. 213 Also contravened was Section 221
of the Constitution, which provides that, "No association, other than a
political party, shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election
or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election
expenses of any candidate at an election."214 Some of the donations
further violated Section 38(2) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act
1990, which prohibits a registered company from directly or indirectly
making a donation or gift of property or funds to a political party or for
any political purpose.215

209.
Ayodele Akinkuotu, Obasanjo in Trouble, TELL (Nigeria), Nov. 20, 2000 at 20.
210.
V ANaUARD (Nigeria), The Ekwueme Panel's Report on the Crisis Between the Legislature
and the Executive, Dec. 22, 2000 at 15.
211.
Chinenye Nwabueze, Dirty Linen, THE WEEK (Nigeria), Nov. 25, 2002 at 19.
212.
TELL (Nigeria), Feb. 7, 2000 at 12.
213.
Ehichioya Ezomon & Fred Okoror, Campaign Finance: Donations or Buying Up the
Democratic Process, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Jan. 24, 2003 at 23.
CONSTITUTION, Art. 221 (1999) (Nigeria).
214.
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Jan. 24, 2003 at 22.; THE WEEK (Nigeria), Apr. 7, 2003
215.
at 10-12.
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In President Obasanjo's desperate bid for a second term in office, he
threw integrity to the wind and restored himself to power at any cost. In
2001, he doctored the Electoral Act sent to him by the National
Assembly for assent. He smuggled a clause into Section SO(1) that said
"new political parties can only participate in the general elections after
2003."216 His calculation was that the existing political parties were too
weak to pose a threat to his ambition. The Act was later repealed when
the fraud was discovered and a new one without the clause was
enacted.217
Immediately before the PDP primaries for the 2003 general elections,
President Obasanjo engineered an amendment to the PDP Constitution,
which made the field uneven for him and other contestants. 218 The party
introduced Section IS(A)(iv) which provided that "All Ministers,
Ambassadors, Special Advisers and Special Assistants to the President
and the Vice President and all chairmen of Boards of Federal parastatals
who are members of the party" shall become voting participants at the
national convention.219
The PDP national convention for the selection of the Party's Presidential
candidate went to the highest bidder.220 Delegates were intimidated by
the use of serially numbered ballot papers, which made it possible to
determine how each delegate voted. 221
The election proper that saw the "re-election" of President Obasanjo for
a second term in office was a monumental fraud. The Presidential
candidate of the National Conscience Party, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, said
of the election:
I have never seen the kind of electoral
the one that took place in Nigeria
elections. We have heard of rigging
scale before, but when it becomes a

216.

217.
218.
at 17,22.

219.

malpractices like
during the last
in some smaller
conscious act of

NEWS WATCH (Nigeria), Dec. 24, 2001 at 47-48.
[d.
JideAjani, PDP's Mid-term Convention of Intrigues, VANGUARD (Nigeria), Dec. 12,2003

Id.

220.
This is however not peculiar to the PDP as it has become a tradition for most of the
political parties in Nigeria; See THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), The Party Primaries: Matters Arising,
Jan. 17,2003 at 12; See also Reuben Abati, The Delegate, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria) Jan. 5, 2003 at
12.
221.
TRANSITION MONITORING GROUP, "Do THE VOTES COUNT?" FINAL REPORT OF THE 2003
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA, at 71 (2003) (Abuja, Nigeria); See also NEWSWATCH (Nigeria),
Jan. 20, 2003 at 28-29.
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governance, dictated by the state, organized by the state,
monumental fraud, figures changed, votes allocated and
awarded, dubious voting, stuffing of ballot boxes [sic].
They used more than 52 methods in rigging that we have
never seen before. 222

In the case of Buhari V. Obasnjo,223 General Muhammed Buhari
challenged the validity of the election of General Obasanjo. The Court
of Appeal found, inter alia, that the election was manipulated in favor of
President Obasanjo in his home state of Ogun. It found that the military
and armed police were deployed during the election without justification,
that there were instances of violence in all forteen states where the
election results were challenged, and that the Independent National
Electoral Commission was neither neutral nor impartial. 224 The Court
also observed that notwithstanding that it had ordered the production of
the original result before the court on the application of the Petitioner,
the Independent National Electoral Commission refused to produce the
result before the court.225 A majority of the court, however, ruled that the
proven malpractices and irregularities did not substantially affect the
result of the election. Nsofor J.C.A., rendered a dissenting opinion,
stating:
... there was not and could not have been afree and fair
presidential election on 1~h April, 2003 in the
atmosphere of violence, insecurity and intimidation by
the agents of the r respondent and connived at by the
3 Td respondent in the states touched upon. 226

The 2002 report issued by Vincent Azie, former acting Auditor-General
of the Federation, indicted the Federal Government for financial
recklessness and misappropriation.227 He was swiftly removed for
exposing corruption. 228 In his place, President Obasanjo appointed
Joseph Ajiboye, who had acted as the Auditor-General of the Federation

Gani Fawehinmi, Worse Than A Lucifer, INSIDER MAGAZINE (Nigeria), Jul. 7, 2003 at 19.
Buhari v. Obasnjo, [2005]2 N.w.L.R. (Pt 910) 241 (Nigeria).
[d.
225.
[d.
226.
[d. at 525.
227.
NEWSWATCH (Nigeria), Feb. 24, 2003 at 24.
228.
Editorial, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Aug. I, 2002 at 12. The editorial, however,
considered it wrong to insist on the federal character principle in the appointment.
222.
223.
224.
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for twelve months prior to the appointment of Mr. Azie without
producing any reports, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. 229
The appointment of Mr. Ajiboye was improper for other reasons as well.
Section 14(3) of the Constitution states:
The composition of the Government of the Federation or
any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be
carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal
character of Nigeria and the need to promote national
unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby
ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons
from a few State or from a few ethnic or other sectional
groups in that Government or in any of its agencies. 230
Until recently, General Obasanjo had placed the nation's treasury,
accounting and auditing system into the hands of persons from his
Yoruba ethnic group, contrary to the letters and the spirit of the
Constitution. 231 Specifically, the Auditor-General of the Federation, the
then-Governor, and the Accountant General were all Yorubian.232 It is
important to remember that Nigeria is a highly ethnic-conscious society,
where few people can raise a voice against the wrong doing of fellow
tribesmen.
A recent lecture delivered by President Obasanjo at the 10th Anniversary
Celebration of Transparency International constitutes another fraud.233
The lecture entitled "From Pond of Corruption to Island of Integrity,"
painted a false and fabricated image of Nigeria on the issue of
corruption. 234 In 1999, when President Obasanjo came to power,
Nigeria's score on the Corruption Perceptions Index of TI was 1.6.235 In
2003, after four years of Obasanjo's reign, Nigeria's score stood at 1.4,
thus indicating a slide in the scale of integrity.236 This position was
229.
Editorial, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Feb. 10, 2003 at 16 (considered the issuance of the
Auditor-General's Report by Azie as a watershed as it was the first of its kind).
230.
CONSTITUTION, Art. 14(3) (1999) (Nigeria).
231.
[d.
232.
[d.
233.
See Lecture delivered by President Obasanjo At The 10th Anniversary Celebration Of
Transparency International, Berlin, Nov 7, 2003, published in THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria),
Nov. 13,2003 at 7-8.
234.
Id.
235.
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS INDEX (1996), available at,
http://www.transparency .orglpolicy_researchisurveys_indices/cpi/previous3Pi_1/1999.
236.
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2003), available at,
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corroborated by a study conducted by the Federal Ministry of Finance, in
which 65.3 percent of the respondents indicated that corruption had
grown worse under the Obasanjo regime.237 Where is the island of
integrity?
In 2004, a Commission of Inquiry found that the former Governor of
Kano State and Minister of Defense, Rabiu Musa Kwakwaso,
misappropriated N850 million of state funds. 238 The Minister retained his
position until the end of President Obasanjo's tenure.
However, despite his short-comings, President Obasanjo's has also made
some bold efforts against corruption, including: firing the former
Minister of Education, Professor Fabian Osuji, for bribing members of
the National Assembly with N55 million.239 President Obasanjo also
brought his weight to bear on the former Senate President, Adolphus
Nwabara, and, among other things, forced him to resign over the N55
million bribe. 240 Also remarkable, is the firing and subsequent conviction
of the Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun, for embezzling over
N14 million belonging to the Nigerian Police Force. 241 The EFCC
brought over ninety-two charges against the former Inspector General of
Police. 242
Nevertheless, the Chairman of the Arewa Consultative Forum, Chief
Sunday Awoniyi observed:
The fountain head of our corruption is traceable to the
spiritual corruption flowing out from Aso Rock. . . When
a man is afflicted with spiritual corruption, he corrupts
everyone around him. He prefers to bring near himself
men who are tainted; men who are filthy and morally
depraved . .. 243

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpiJ2003.
237.
lNST. FOR DEV. RESEARCH, NIGERIA GoVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION SURVEY STUDY:
OVERALL SUMMARY REPORT 8 (June 2003) (Nigeria), available at,
http://www.accountabilitynigeria.org/reportslnigeria%20overall.pdf.
238.
Adamu Abu, Kana May Take Kwakwanso to EFCC, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria),
Dec. 2, 2004 at 4.
239.
Chris Ajaero, The EFCC repon on Wabara and Osuji, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria),
Apr. 4, 2005 at 15.
240.
Jd.
241.
Olu Ojewale, The Unusual Crime Fighter, TELL (Nigeria), Jan. 1612006 at 19.
242.
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Apr. 5, 2005 at 1.
243.
Azimazi Momoh Jimoh, Awoniyi, Mantu Disagree Over President's Crusade on Graft,
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Apr. II, 2005 at 1-2.
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Chief Adetokunbo Kayode, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria, while under
investigation for allegations of bribing officials of the Independent
Electoral Commission for W21 million, was nominated by President
Obasanjo for a ministerial position. 244 Recently, two writers, Michael
Fell and Dino Mahtani, of the London Financial Times reviewed the
reform agenda of this administration. 245 They acknowledged the current
prosecution of big fish (influential members/government officials) by the
EFCe. They mentioned former Senate President, Adolphus Wabara,
Education Minister, Professor Fabian Osuji and former Inspector General
of Police, Mr. Tafa Balogun, saying that the public has welcomed their
prosecution. 246 This, however, has not deferred them from questioning
the efficacy of the anti-corruption campaign:
Yet many Nigerians see the anti-corruption drive as
highly selective, focused on the President's enemies or
the politically expendable and doing little to address
institutional failings. An anti-corruption commission set
up by the President has yet to bring a successful high
profile prosecution. 247

Towards the end of President Obasanjo's second term in office, he tried
to manipulate the Constitution to extend his tenure from the
constitutionally- prescribed two terms to a third term.248 This plot failed
when the Senate defeated the bill to amend the Constitution. 249
On May 29th, 2007, Umar Yar'adua was sworn in as President of
Nigeria.
The April 2004 general elections that ushered in his
administration were marred by unprecedented electoral fraud and
violence. 25o Human Rights Watch report on the elections said:
Instead of guaranteeing citizens' basic right to vote
freely, Nigerian government electoral officials actively
colluded in the fraud and violence that marred the
presidential polls in some areas.
In other areas,
officials closed their eyes to human rights abuses
244.
Emmanuel Onwubiko, EFCC Cuts Charges Against Ba/ogun, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria),
Apr. 29, 200S at l.
24S.
Kayode Komolafe, Anti-Corroption War; Beyond Idealism, THISDAY (Nigeria),
June S, 200S at 31.
246.
/d.
247. /d.
248.
Tabs Agbaegbu and Chris Ajaero, A Dream Killed, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria),
May 29, 2006 at IS.
249.
Id.
2S0.
See http/hrw.orglEnglish/docs/2007/04/24/nigeri/S763.htm.
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committed by supporters of the ruling party and
others. 251

President Yar'adua's Attorney General, Michael Aondoakaa,
undennined the independence of the anti-corruption agencies (i.e. the
ICPC, the EFCC and the Code of Conducts Bureau) by interfering in
their prosecutorial powers. 252 The Attorney General of the Federation
was apparently working for the former Governors who had been arrested,
investigated, and charged with corruption. 253 He exposed (portrayed) the
concept of the rule of law negatively, in order to protect the former
Governors. 254 Transparency in Nigeria, Nigeria's national chapter of
Transparency International, has said that in Nigeria the rule of law has
become a fa~ade for impunity.255 Today, the widely held view is that the
anti -corruption battle has been slowed down by the Yar' Adua regime
because the involvement of friends and campaign donors. 256 Recently,
President Y ar' Adua approved the action of the Inspector General of
Police, who illegally sent the EFCC Chairman (an Assistant Inspector
General of Police) to the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Study
for further studies, which is a ploy to ease Ribadu out of office.257 The
Nobel Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka, while comparing the tacit
removal of Ribadu with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan
said:
. . . the precarious socio-political condition into which
the Pakistani people have been thrown echoed in both
parallel and divergent directions, the blow dealt to the
Nigerian nation by the "assassination" of the head of
the EFCC.

251. Id.(The final report of the Human Rights Watch on the 2007 general elections is entitled
"Criminal Politics: Violence, 'Godfathers and Corruption in Nigeria" documents the most important
human rights dimensions of the crisis of governance: politicians and other political elites openly
encouraging systemic violence; the corruption that fuels and rewards Nigeria's violent brand of
politics at the expense of the general populace; and the impunity enjoyed by those responsible for
these abuses that deny justice to their victims and constitute a roadblock to reform.); See also
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Nigeria's Politics Mired in Corruption and Violence, Oct. 10,2007 at 9.
252. Jibrin Abubakar, Aondoakaa Caged EFCC - Transparency in Nigeria, DAILY TRUST
(Nigeria), Dec. 11, 2007 at 1.
253. Bayo Bernard, The Aondoakaa Agenda, SOURCE (Nigeria), Oct. 151 2007 at 16.
254.
See THISDAY (Nigeria), Jan. 1,2008 at 7 (considering Michael Aondoakaa, the Attorney
General of the Federation as the "Worst Exponent of Rule of Law").
255. Bamidele Johnson & Ayorinde Oluokun, Time to Face Justice, THE NEWS (Nigeria),
Nov. 24, 2007 at 22.
256. Id.
257.
Madu Onuorab, Yaradua O/wys Ribadufor Kuru, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria),
Jan. 3, 2008 at 1.
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Ribadu had commenced the process of restoring
dignity to a people whose nation has become a byword
for the most breath-taking scam in high-places, for
endemic corruption, contempt for accountability and
transparency and the abuse of national resources in the
pursuit of personal and party power consolidation. 258
B.

THE LEGISLATURE
CORRUPTION

AND

THE

POLITICAL

WILL

TO

FIGHT

The legislative branch of government in Nigeria has not shown any
political will to fight corruption. Nigerians play what is called prebendal
politics. 259 In Nigeria, power is personalized. The control of the state
and its parastatals is expected to translate to instant wealth. The
legislators are not content with their law making function. They want to
take part in awarding contracts and running ministries and parastatals
where they can make money.
It is an open secret that before passing bills presented by the Executive,
particularly money bills, legislative houses across the country ask for and
obtain pecuniary rewards. 260 Before passing the year 2001 budget, N500
million was earmarked for every Senatorial Zone for "constituency
projects." The legislators would participate in selecting contractors for
the projects and in the supervision of the execution of the project. The
question arises: who will exercise the oversight function with respect to
those projects?
The former Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Mr. EI Rufai, told
Nigerians that Senators Ibrahim Mantu and Jonathan Zwingina
. demanded a N54 million bribe from him in order to facilitate his
clearance by the Senate. 261 The two Senators are not alone, it has been
alleged that most ministers paid for their clearance. 262 As mentioned
earlier, the former Senate President, Adolphus Wabara, presided over the
sharing of a N55 million bribe from the former Minister of Education,
Professor Fabian Osuji, for influencing the ministry's vote. 263

258.
Yemi Adebowale, Soyinka, Gani Condemn Ribadu's Ouster, THISDAY (Nigeria),
Dec. 29,2007 at I.
259.
RICHARD A. JOSEPH, DEMOCRACY AND PREBENDAL POLITICS IN NIGERIA 55 (1987).
Salif Atojoko, The Rape of Nigeria, NEWSWATCH (Nigeria), Nov. 15,2004 at 17.
260.
Salif Atojoko, Ministers Who Paid To Be Cleared, NEWSW ATCH (Nigeria),
261.
Oct. 6, 2003 at 32.
262.
Id. at 22-27.
263.
Chris Ajaero, The EFCC Report on Wabara, Osuji, NEWSW ATCH (Nigeria),
Apr. 4, 2005 at 15.
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It is alleged that the multi-national telecommunications company, MTN,
gives free monthly recharge cards worth N7,500.00 and NlO,OOO.OO to
every member of the House of Representatives and every Senator. 264
C.

THE JUDICIARY AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO FIGHT CORRUPTION

The Supreme Court of Nigeria has made certain pronouncements
indicating a strong will to fight corruption. In A.G. Ondo State V. A.G.
Federation,265 the Supreme Court used judicial activism to sustain the
Corrupt Practices and Related Offenses Act 2000 as constitutional. If the
Supreme Court had relied on existing judicial authorities and orthodox
Constitutional principles, the Act may have been pronounced
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court observed in that case:
... in our own situation, taking the issue of corruption
and abuse of power nationally will best serve the
interests of all and the general welfare of Nigeria, both
nationally and internationally. Corrupt practices have
become an overwhelming malaise for Nigeria. It cannot
be left totally to individual states. 266

The high courts, however, have been a stumbling block in the fight
against corruption through the abuse of their power to grant injunctions.
An Abuja High Court on December 31, 2003 restrained the ICPC and the
Attorney-General of the Federation from investigating allegations of
financial impropriety leveled against the former Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Alhaji Ghali Na' Abba, pending the determination of the
substantive suit. 267 The injunction was granted based on an ex parte
motion. 268

In 2001 the Senate set up the Oyofo Committee to investigate alleged
cases of impropriety in the award of contracts by the National Assembly.
The Committee in its report indicted the then Senate President Dr. Chuba
Okadigbo and Senators Rowland Owie, Gbenga Aluko, Abubakar Girei
and Haruna Abubakar for impropriety in the award of contracts. The
indicted persons obtained a court injunction restraining the Attorney264.
A member of the House of Representatives, Hon. Haruna Yerima, made the allegation.
See Martins Oloja, Anti-Graft Crusade: A Road Strewn With Thoms, THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria),
Apr. 10, 2005 at 23.
265.
A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation, [2(02)) NWLR (pt. 772) 222 (Nigeria).
266. [d. at 404 - 405.
267.
Lemmy Ughegbe, Abuja Court Stops Anti-graft Panel on Na' Abba, VANGUARD (Nigeria),
Nov. 2, 2002, at 3.
268. [d.
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General of the Federation, the Inspector General of Police, and even the
Senate from arresting or initiating criminal proceedings against them. 269
The issue reached the point where the Chief Justice of Nigeria had to
issue a warning to judges who issued injunctions without due
consideration for the tenets of fairness, equity, transparency and
responsibility.270 Recently, two senior Advocates of Nigeria, Kayode
Adetokunbo and Damian Dodo, were arraigned before an Abuja High
Court for offering gratification to some officers of the Independent
National Electoral Comrnission.271 On the day of the arraignment, the
High Court suo motu discharged them without reasonable grounds. 272
Fortunately, the ICPC has appealed against the discharge. 273
The courts in a number of cases render interpretations that protect
corrupt practices. For instance, an Abuja High Court dealt a fatal blow
to the Code of Conduct mechanism for fighting corruption when it held,
without justification, that the Code of Conduct mechanism is subject to
the Immunity Clause.274 The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
Yusuf v. Obasanjo275 may contribute to the breeding of corruption in
Nigerian's electoral process. In the Yusuf case, the appellant had sought
to join Corporate Nigeria (Limited by Guarantee) as a party to the
election petition for its donation of N2 billion to President Obasanjo,
contrary to Section 221 of the Constitution. 276 The Supreme Court, in
refusing the application for joinder, held that the donation is not a corrupt
act and does not amount to undue influence. 277 The Court should have, at
least, pronounced on the illegality and unconstitutionality of the action of
Corporate Nigeria in making the political donation when the Constitution
expressly prohibits it.
The Supreme Court has also rendered interpretations that will inhibit the
anti-corruption drive. The interpretation given to the term locus standi
by the Supreme Court will obviously inhibit the ability of members of
civil society to fight corruption. In Adesanya v. The Presidenf78 the
majority of the Supreme Court held that, despite the enthusiasm of all in
ensuring compliance with the Constitution, the right of the individual to
269.
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), May 13,2001 at 18.
270.
THE GUARDIAN (Nigeria), Nov. 6, 2001 at I.
271.
Mikail Mumuni, This is Our Own Story, TELL (Nigeria), May 30, 2005 at 20.
272.
Id.
273.
VANGUARD (Nigeria), June 24, 2005 at 12.
274.
Joshua Chidi Dariye v Code of Conduct Bureau & 2 Ors Unreported Suit
No. FHC/AB/JSI507/2004 (Judgment delivered on 6 th December, 2004).
275.
Yusuf v. Obasanjo, [2003] 16 N.W.L.R. (Pt.847) 554 (Nigeria).
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Adesanya v. The President [1981] S.C. 112; 2 ALL N.L.R. [Part I] 1 (Nigeria).
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engage in such an exercise in court can only arise where circumstances
of an oppressive or hostile nature exist, and where the rights of the
citizens guaranteed under the law and Constitution are curtailed or
invaded or breached by a violation of, or non-compliance with the
Constitution. 279 Accordingly, the mere fact that an act of the Executive
or Legislature is unconstitutional is insufficient for an individual to
challenge it in court. An individual must allege an infraction of rights or
adverse effect on civil rights and obligations, to challenge the
constitutionality of an act. 280 The Supreme Court also held in Nwankwo
v. Nwankw028 I that a private person has no locus standi to prosecute the
contravention of the Code of Conduct. 282
Perhaps, Section 35 on fundamental rights in the 1995 Constitutional
draft provides a way to overcome the problem of locus standi, it
provides:
Every person shall have the right to:

(a) ensure the eradication of corrupt practices, and
abuse of power;
(b) protect and preserve public property;
(c) fight against misappropriation and squandering of
public fund. 283
Only the makers of the 1999 Constitution can explain why these laudable
provisions were not incorporated into the Constitution.
In any case, the Mrican Charter has come to the rescue. Article 13(3) of

the Mrican Charter provides as follows: "Every individual shall have the
right of access to public property and services in strict equality of all
persons before the law."284 In Abacha v. Fawehinmi, the Supreme Court
held that the individual rights contained in the Articles of the African
Charter are justifiable in Nigerian CourtS. 285 The Charter submits, that
where a person has stolen public funds or property, other citizens of
279.
Id.
280. /d.
281.
Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, [1995]5 N.w.L.R. (pt.394) 153 (Nigeria).
282. Id.
283.
See Section 35 of the draft 1995 Constitution of Nigeria. However, this Constitution never
came into force.
284.
Organization of African Unity, African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
art. 13(3), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
285.
Abacha v. Fawehinmi, [2002]6 N.W.L.R. (pt 660) 228 (Nigeria).
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Nigeria are thereby denied access to these funds or property, and they
can therefore bring action for the restitution of the funds or property.
Another decision which has implications for the fight against corruption
is State v. S.A /lori,286 in which the Supreme Court held, contrary to the
clear provisions of the Constitution, that the exercise of powers and
discretion vested in the Attorney-General cannot be questioned in court,
even where the Attorney-General has clearly abused his office. 287 It is
true that this may be the position in England and some other places
where the Attorney-General is independent and impartial. However, in
the Nigerian situation, the Attorney-General is merely a politician who
has no security of tenure. He is normally subject to the whims and
caprices of his appointer. The Attorney-General may also abuse his
office for his own personal gain. The former Attorney-General of the
federation, Kanu Agabi, entered a nolle prosequi in the charge brought
against former permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Dr. Julius
Makanjuola, and four others for allegedly embezzling the sum of N420
million. 288

IX. CONCLUSION
Corruption is the bane of the Nigerian society. It is a clog in the
realization of human rights, including socio-economic rights. It turns
law enforcement agents into violators of the law. Corruption is an
incentive to violate human rights because it enables violators to escape
legal sanctions. It enables the resources and property of the state to be
personalized and privatized, thus depriving the people of their fair share
of public property and services. Corruption retards development. It
debases democracy and turns it into an instrument of enslavement instead
of emancipation.
Before Nigerian's nascent 'democracy', there were legal and institutional
mechanisms for fighting corruption. However, this legal framework has
some obvious defects. The framework focused more on public sector
corruption. Furthermore, the provisions are so technical and complex
that in many cases persons who ought to have been found gUilty were set
free. The different ad hoc measures by various regimes were never
sustained.

286.
State v. S.A Dori, [1983]. 1 S.C.N.L.R. 94; 1983 N.C.R. 283 (Nigeria).
287.
[d.
288.
Charles Ozoemena. N420m Fraud Trial: Obasanjo Queries Attorney-General. VANGUARD
(Nigeria). July 25. 2002 at 1.
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The Constitutional measures against corruption, which include the
auditing of public accounts by the Auditor-General, and the
consideration of same by the public accounts committee of the
Legislature has been rendered ineffective as a result of the absence of
governmental political will. The Code of Conduct mechanism has also
been rendered impotent by the Executive and Judiciary branches. If the
Code of Conduct Bureau was given adequate financial resources and was
properly operated through legislation, it would stand as a bulwark against
corruption.
As a result of the absence of independence in the Legislature, there is no
effective legislative oversight of the Executive branch. The Legislature
is endowed with pre-appropriation, appropriation, and post-appropriation
oversight powers over the Executive. The Legislature should recognize
that they owe a duty to the Nigerian people. They are not in office for
personal aggrandizement.
The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act 2000 is a
welcome development intended to cure some of the defects of existing
laws on corruption as well as meet the new dimensions of corruption.
However, it is imperative that the Act is amended to include living a
lifestyle above ones legitimate and known means as an offense. The
punishments for corruption offenses in the Act should also be made more
severe. The amendment of the Act in 2002 by the Legislature to make
the Chairman of the Commission appointable by the Chief Justice of
Nigeria will restore public confidence in the Commission when
implemented. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has
done well so far but there is room for improvement.
It would appear that the most important factor in the fight against

corruption is political will on the part of the Executive, the Legislature,
the Judiciary, and civil society. Political will is presently lacking in all
these branches of government because it is difficult to expect political
will from people who manipulated their way into power. Therefore, free
and fair elections are essential in the fight against corruption.
It is true that President Obasanjo took courageous steps in the fight

against corruption, but his greatest setback is legitimacy in his
government. This has affected his ability to mobilize the people in the
fight. Currently, the entire system is one of corruption fighting
corruption. Furthermore, instead of institutionalizing the fight against
corruption, President Obasanjo took the matter upon himself and acted in
a selective manner.
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The Supreme Court unwittingly inhibited the war against corruption
through its restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of locus standi and
the unfettering of the discretion of the Attorney-General. Hopefully the
Supreme Court will revisit the decisions if provided the appropriate
opportunity. The menace of corruption has become so dire in Nigeria
that there should be express Constitutional provisions for the right to
eradicate corrupt practices and abuses of power. The reckless grant of
injunctions by the High Courts to stop investigation and prosecution of
corruption cases must be checked if there is to be a meaningful war
against corruption in Nigeria.
President Yar' Adua who came to power through a flawed election
slowed down the tempo of the anti-corruption war. The Attorney General
of the Federation under Yar' Adua's regime clearly undermined the fight
against corruption through his interference in the activities of the anticorruption agencies.
In the final analysis, the battle against corruption in Nigeria can only

succeed when it is institutionalized and when there is demonstrated
political will to fight corruption, which is presently lacking.
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